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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AR'THUR W. F AIRCLO,UGH, FRED 
FAIRCLOUGH, AN'THONY M. 
CRUS, THOMAS CRUS, and JOHN 
CRUS, doing business as FAIR-
CLOUGH & CRUS, 
Plaintiffs .and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUN'TY, LAM·ONT B. ·Case No. 9140 
GUNDERSON, WILLIAM G. LAR-
SON and EDWIN Q. CANN·ON, SR.; 
ROAD COMMISSION OF UITAH, 
C. TAYLOR BURTON, FRANCIS 
FELTCH, ERNES'T H. BALCH, 
WILLIAM J. SMIRL and WE'STON 
E. HAMILTON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RE'S'P'ONDENITS 
S'TATEMENT OF FA~C'T'S 
Respondents agree with appellants' statement 
of facts. We also agree that a suit against the State 
Road Commission and against Salt Lake County is 
in essence a suit against the State of Utah. 
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STATElVIENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NO'T ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLAN'TS' MO'TION TO DISMISS. 
POINT II 
IF THE SUPREME C·OUR'T HOLDS THAT SOVER-
EIGN IMMUNITY IS A DEFENSE TO THE AC·TION 
FOR DAMAGES, THEN A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
SHOULD I8SUE. 
ARGUMEN'T 
P·OINT I 
'THE CO·URT DID NO'T ERR IN DENYING AP-
P·ELLAN'TS' MO'TION TO DISMISS. 
Respondents' property is adjacent·to and abuts 
3900 South Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, on 
the north side thereof. The Road Commission or 
Salt Lake County or ·both of them .lowered the 
grade of 3900 South to a point where it has com-
pletely destroyed responden·ts' , ingress and egress. 
Respondents' property. is now- completely inacces-
sible and by reason of the destruction of the ingress 
and egress to the property, it ·has depreciated sub-
stantially in value. 
'The following constitutional provisions require 
consideration in determining the question before 
the court. 
Article I, Section 22 
Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compen-
sation. · 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Article I, Section 26 
The provisions of this constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express 
vvords they are declared to be otherwise. 
Article I, Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every per-
son, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due cot1rse of law, which shall be adminis-
tered without denial or unnecessary delay. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Kim-
ball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 395 and 
Hempste~ad v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90 P. 
I 
397 has held that lowering of the grade of a street 
is a damaging within the meaning of that word as 
it is used in Article I, Section 22 of the Constitu-
tion. 
The precise question that is now before this 
court has been considered by the courts of last 
resort of many states. 
It is our position, (1) that the provisions of 
Article I, Section 22 are "self-executing" and that 
the legislature cannot deprive a property owner of 
the right granted thereunder by its failure to enact 
a statute providing for a remedy to recover damages 
when private property is injured for a public use, 
and (2) that said constitutional provision consti-
tutes a consent by the 'State of Utah that it may ·be 
sued for such damages. 
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Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505. 
The State of California constructed a subway in the 
street in such a manner that it substantially inter-
fered with plaintiff's right of ingress and egress to 
his property. The case involved an action against 
the State of California to recover damages by reason 
of the depreciation in the value of the property. The 
California Supreme Court held that the action could 
be maintained against the state and in so doing 
quoted 18 Am. Jur., p. 1028 as follows. 
"Under such a constitutional guarantee, 
the right to recover in an action in damages 
for consequential injury has been sustained 
in a number of cases. It is held that the con-
stitutional provision is self-executing; that is, 
that eve11 if a statute has not been enacted 
providing a remedy for damage for the con-
struction of public works, the landowner is 
entitled to enforce his constitutional right to 
compensation in a common law action. 
The court further said, 
"'That the constitutional provision that 
property cannot be tal\:en or damaged for a 
public use constitutes a consent ·by the state 
that it may be sued for damages." 
R.enninger v. State, 70 Ida. 190, 213 P. 2d 911. 
This was an action by a landowner against the 
State of Idaho to recover compensation for flooding 
of plaintiff's land that resulted from raising the 
grade of a highway which in turn obstructed the 
natural flow of the river causing it to overflow on 
plaintiff's land. The trial court sustained a demurrer 
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to plaintiff's complaint and the Supreme Court 
reversed. 
The Constitution of Idaho provided, 
"'The property of no person shall be tak-
en for public use without just compensation 
therefor." 
It should be noted that the Idaho Constitution 
merely prohibits a taking of private property. It 
does not prohibit the damaging as well as the taking 
like the Utah Constitution does. T'he Supreme Court 
of Idaho held that the constitutional provision that 
private property may not be taken without paying 
just compensation is self-executing and that it waiv-
ed the immunity of the state to be sued. In so hold-
ing the court said, 
"'This provision of the constitution, there-
fore, waives the immunity of the state from 
suit, and if the states takes the property with-
out condeming, the landowner, to give full 
force and effect to the provision of the con-
stitution as self-executing, must be entitled 
to sue therefor and such are the universal 
holdings of the courts which have occasion to 
consider this specific point; that is, where 
the state has taken private property for pub-
lic lise without paying for it, and tries to 
avoid paying by claiming immunity." 
Logan County v. John Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 
P. 621. This was an action by a landowner against 
the county to recover damages that resulted when 
the county constructed a bridge that caused water 
to ·back up on plaintiff's land. The court held such 
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an action could be maintained against the county. 
B~acich v. Board of Control, 128 P. 2d 191. This 
is another case where the California Court followed 
the holding in Rose v. State, supra, and held that 
a landowner could maintain an action against the 
state to recover consequential damages. The court 
reaffirmed the holding that the constitutional pro-
vision against the taking or damaging of property 
without just compensation is self-executing and con-
stitutes the consent of the state to be sued in such 
proceedings. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in the case of In 
Re Forsstram .et ux, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P. 2d 878, held 
that the constitutional ~provision in Arizona against 
the taking or damaging of property without just 
compensation was not self-executing, and it further 
held that if the plaintiff's property is damaged as 
distinguished from being taken that there was no 
right of action that could be maintained against the 
state inasmuch as the legislature had failed to pro-
vide any means by which ·to enforce the rights given 
by the constitution. 
The ~supreme Court of Arizona in the case of 
County of Mohave v. Chamberlain, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 
P. 2d 128 ( 1955), overruled the holding in the Fors-
strom case and in so doing the court said, 
'"The overwhelming majority of courts to 
which such a question has been presented do 
not agree with this holding. Ros.e v. State, 19 
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Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505; Morgan v. Board 
of S~tpervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236. 
We cannot but agree with the logic therein. 
As the Supreme Court of California so well 
stated in the Rose case, ''The legislature by 
statutory enactment may not abrogate or deny 
r.. v-i2'ht granted by the constitution. And it 
follows as a logical conclusion that a right 
constitutionally granted cannot be taken away 
by the failure of the legislature to act.' 
* * * 
"We hold that the ruling in the Fors-
strom case to the effect that the provisions of 
Article 2, Section 17 concerning compensation 
for property taken or damaged for public use, 
are not self-executing is erroneous and is 
therefore expressly overruled. It follows that 
any language therein to the effect that com-
pensation for "damaging" for public use could 
not be made without legislative enactment is 
likewise erroneous." 
The Arizona court followed the same rule laid 
down in the County of Mohave case, supra, in the 
case of State Vo £,eeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 3'23 P. 2d 692. 
Layman v. Beeler, 113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995. 
This case involved an action by a landowner against 
the county to recover consequential damages to his 
property by reason of the change of grade of a high-
way. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the 
complaint and dismissed the action. In reversing 
the· trial court, the Supreme Court said, 
''The provision of. t?e ~onstit~tion ~hich 
requires that the municipality taking private 
property for public use 'shall make just com-
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pensation for the property taken, injured or 
destroyed by them,' necessarily implies that, if 
the corporation should fail to make the com-
pensation before the taking or injuring, it is 
liable therefore after such taking or injury, 
and that, if it will not pay the damages an 
action is necessarily authorized to be insti-
tuted against it; for it would be idle to give 
to a party a right without a re1nedy to enforce 
it. We therefore conclude that, if the facts 
alleged in the petition be true, that is, that 
the improvement of the highway in question 
did so impair the plaintiff's adjacent lands 
and their value as to damage him, that was a 
taking and injury within the contemplation 
and meaning of the constitution, and the lan-
guage of that section necessarily implies a 
right upon the part of the citizen to maintain 
his action against the county to recover such 
damages, if not otherwise settled.'' 
The Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
holding in Layman v. Beeler, supra, in the case of 
Cranley v. Boyd County, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W. 2d 
737. The Court said, 
"Not as an exception to the rule of sov-
ereign immunity of the county from liability 
for torts, but as a constitutional requirement, 
though a negation, is the rule that a county 
is legally answerable for trespass in the tak-
ing or injury of a citizen's property. It arises 
from the a'bsolute terms of Section 13 of the 
Constitution of Kentucky, declaring that no 
man's property shall ·be taken or applied to a 
public use without his consent and without 
just compensation being paid him and of Sec-
tion 24·2 providing that those corporations 
or individuals invested with the privilege of 
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taking· private property for public use shall 
make just compensation for property 'taken, 
injured or destroyed by them'. The interpre-
tation and application of these provisions in 
relation to counties, since Layman v. Beeler, 
113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995, (as previously ap-
plied to cities), has been that they must re-
spond and make compensation to the owner 
of property a~tually appropriated or of pro-
perty abutting on roads and highways which 
has been injured or dan1aged in a manner 
regarded as a taking.'' 
C·ampbell v. Arkans.as State Highw~ay Commis-
sion, 183 Arlc 780, 38 S.W. 2d 753. This was an 
action by a landowner to recover damages from the 
State Highvvay Commission that resulted when the 
grade of the highvvay was changed and the owner's 
ingress a11d egress obstructed. The trial court en-
tered a judgment for the defendant and the Supreme 
Court on appeal reversed. The Supreme Court used 
the following language in holding that the land-
owner could maintain the action against the High-
way Commission, 
"There is nothing in the contention that 
the Arkansas State Highway Commission 
could not be sued in this kind of action. * * * 
When the grade of the highway was raised 
by the construction of the bridge and its ap-
proaches to the damage of the lots of abutting 
owners such act brought the case within the 
guarantee of the cl~use of the constitution 
above referred to. Neither the state nor any of 
its agencies is exempt from the constitutional 
guarantee that private properties shall not 
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be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation therefor. * * * It is true 
that the Arkansas State Highway Commission 
did not institute condemnation proceedings 
against the property owners, but the property 
owners had a right to maintain this action. 
It was a remedy given them under the common 
law for a trespass or injury to their real es-
tate. The right existed under the provision of 
the constitution; and, where the statute pro-
vides no adequate remedy, it may be enforced 
by an action for damageso County of Chester 
v. BrovJer, 117 Pa. 647, 12 Atl. 577; Swift & 
·Comp,any v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 
SoE. 821. In the case last cited it was held 
that a constitutional provision that private 
property shall not be damaged for public use 
without compensation is self-executing, and 
the common law will furnish an appropriate 
remedy in the absence of one expressly given 
'by constitution or statute. This view is sus-
tained by our own cases above cited and is in 
harmony with the views expressed in them." 
See Le,eman v. Williams et al, 301 Ky. 729, 193 
S.W. 2d 161 (1946) for a later Kentucl\:y case to the 
same effect. For additional cases on the same prob-
lem see Jacobsen v. State of North Dakota, D.epart-
ment of State Highways .et al, 278 N.W. 662, 68 
N.D. 25'7; State Road Department of Florida et al, 
v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 7 45, 1 So. 2d 868; Little v. B1tr 
leigh County, 82 N.W. 2d 603 (1957) (North Da-
kota); ·Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway 
Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842. 
In the instant· case it should be kept in mind 
10 
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that plaintiffs' action for damages is against Salt 
Lake County and the Road Commission. Plaintiffs 
do not seel\: to recover damages from the Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake County nor from the Road 
Commissioners. The Utah Constitution prohibits the 
"taking· or damaging" of private property for public 
use without paying just compensation. The consti-
tution also provides that the provisions therein con-
tained a~e "mandatory and prohi1bitory". 'The con-
stitution clearly gives a private property owner a 
right to compensation if his property is damaged for 
a public use. Where there is a right there must be 
a remedy. We urge this court that the remedy lies 
in holding that the constitutional provision quoted 
above is self-executing and that it constitutes a con-
sent on the part of the state to be sued and is a 
waiver of sovereign immunity in this type of case. 
Appellants cite State of Utah v. Fourth Judi-
cial District Court, 94 Utah '384, 78 P. 2d 502, as 
authority for the proposition that sovereign immu-
nity is a defense in a case of this type. The case 
does not so hdld. A careful reading of it demonstrates 
that the holding of the case was that the individual 
road commissioners may be enjoined from construct-
ing public works that will caus.e injury or damage 
to an owner's property, unless the road commission-
ers cause just compensation to 'be paid to the owner 
for such damage. As stated before we do not 'believe 
11 
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that the Fourth Judicial District Court case is a 
holding against the position that we now take, how-
ever, if it is viewed by the court as authority against 
our position, we earnestly and sincerely urge this 
court to overrule that decision just as the Arizona 
Supreme Court did, and adopt the rule that has 
been adopted by every court of last resort that has 
had occasion to consider the question, namely; that 
the constitutional provision, Article I, Section 22, 
is self-executing and that it constitutes a consent on 
the part of the State of Utah to be sued. The order 
of the trial court denying appellants' motion to dis-
miss should be affirmed and the case should be re-
manded to the lower court for trial. 
POIN'T II 
IF THE SUPREME COUR'T HOLDS THAT SOVER-
EIGN IMMUNITY IS A DEFENSE 'TO THE ACTION 
FOR DAMAGES, THEN A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
SHO·ULD ISSUE. 
If this court should hold that sovereign immu-
nity is a defense to plaintiffs' action for damages 
against the Road Commission and Salt Lake County, 
then we think the plaintiffs are entitled to have the 
order of the trial court recalling the alternative 
writ of mandamus set aside and an order of this 
court directing the trial court to enter an order 
making the writ of mandamus permanent as against 
12 
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I I 
the individtlal Road Cornmissioners and the indivi-
dtlal County Commissioners. 
55 C.J.S. Section 178 (b) p. 339 states the rule 
as follovvs, 
''1VI:a11damus is an appropriate remedy to 
c~)~:1p:l officials taking private property for 
street and highway purposes to comply with 
the stat1xtes governing such matters. It will 
lie to compel the institution of condemnation 
proceedings where land or rights therein have 
been taken for street or highway purposes or 
injured tl1ereby v1ithout compensating the 
owner; and to compel the proper authorities 
to proceed v1ith the determination of the dam-
ages to property owners occasioned 1by the con-
struction or opening of a street or highway, 
a change of grade or other hig'hway improve-
mentso'' 
'The cases of People v. Kingery, 369 Ill. 28'9, 16 
N~ E. '2d 761; Riggs v. State Road Commissioner, 
120 W. Va. 298, 19'7 S.E. 813; Hardy v. Simpson, 
Road Commissioner, 180 W. V. 440, 190 'S.E. 680; 
State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W. 2d 62; 
Grunewald Va City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E. 
2d 739; Emanuel v. Sproat, 136 N.J. Laws 18'3, 54 
Atl. 2d 760; App~al,achian Electric Company v. Saw-
yers, 141 W. V. 769, 93 S.E. 2d 25; B~aird v. John-
son, 230 Ia. 161, 297 N.W. 315; Anderlik v. State 
Highw~ay Commission, 240 Ia. 919, '238 N.W. 2d 
605, involve the question of whether mandamus. is 
a proper remedy to compel the individual commis-
sioners to institute proper proceedings so that the 
13 
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amount of just compensation can be determined 
and ordered paid. The cases cited hold that man-
damus is a proper remedy. 
Springville B~anking Comp,any v. C. T~aylor Bur-
ton, et ,al, Case No. 9066, is now pending in this 
court. 'The brief of appellant in that case contains 
an excellent discussion of the cases where mandamus 
was held to be a proper remedy under circumstances 
similar to the case at bar. 
The trial court's order should be affirmed. To 
hold otherwise is to hold that the legislature by non-
action can deprive an owner of a right granted by 
the constitution. This court had no difficulty in the 
case of C~ampbell Building Company v. State Road 
Commission, 9'5 Uta'h 242, 70 P. 2d 857, in holding 
that the enactment of Section 2'7-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, 
constituted consent on the part of the state to be sued 
on written contracts. We cannot see why the con-
stitutional provision, Article I, Section 22, should 
not be given at least the dignity of a legislative 
enactment. 
If the court should hold that sovereign immu-
nity is a defense to this action, then an order should 
be made directing the trial court to issue a writ of 
mandamus and make the same permanent. 
Respectfully su'bmitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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